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1 Introduction
There is an increasing debate about the optimal board tenure length and board refresh-
ment among both practitioners and academics. The main dispute lies in boards with
long-tenured directors are subject to alignment with the management, in contrast, a
straightforward shortening of directors’ tenures may result in their insufficient experience
to understand corporate business and history, and thus failing to fulfill their advisory
and monitoring roles.1 As such, an alternative proposed way of tackling the issue of the
optimal tenure length is to consider the diversity in the length of directors’ tenure, rather
than fixing term limits on each directorship (Li and Wahid, 2018).2
Tenure length diversity emphasizes that, as long as a firm retains diversity in terms
of both long and short-tenured directors, it may benefit from both knowledge continuity
and independence, which are crucial to high-quality corporate decision-making.3 In this
study, we aim to examine the impact of board tenure diversity on firm risk. Our focus
on risk-related corporate outcomes stems from economic and social psychology studies
that suggest team diversity affects group decisions, which in turn affects the uncertainty
of decisions. Board diversity may affect firm risk due to the uncertainty it introduces
to the board’s decisions. Furthermore, boards of directors now face more demanding
expectations regarding their role in risk oversight.4
Board tenure diversity, like other forms of diversity (e.g., gender, background, and
experience), is often deemed to be a double-edged sword (Milliken and Martins, 1996).
On the one hand, boards with diverse director tenure lengths may benefit from having
both senior and junior directors, who may carry out checks and balances on each other,
enhancing the monitoring of firm decisions. It is unlikely for such heterogeneous and inde-
pendent groups to reach idiosyncratic decisions which would result in extreme outcomes
and induce higher firm risk (Kogan and Wallach, 1966; Bernile et al., 2018). On the other
1See for example, ISS 2013-2014 Policy Survey; Beasley (1996); Anderson et al. (2004); Huang and
Hilary (2018).
2Prior studies have shown that both the traits and diversity of team members’ cognitive resources are
important in understanding team performance (Hoffman, 1959; Hoffman and Maier, 1961).
3Also, regulations on tenure length diversity, rather than just fixing a maximum tenure for each
directorship, can provide firms with more flexibility to determine the timing of director replacement.
4For example, see Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation S-K 407(h).
2
hand, as board members with different tenures can have heterogeneous knowledge, opin-
ions and views, diversity can exacerbate internal conflict and divisiveness (Simons and
Peterson, 2000), and obstruct coordination and communication (Van den Steen, 2010)
during the decision-making process. In such circumstances, the decision outcomes can be
even more uncertain and risky due to the difficulty of attaining consensus (Arrow, 1951).
Our empirical analysis examines how board tenure diversity impacts on firms’ stock
return volatility in 37 countries between 1999 and 2017. The baseline results suggest
that the negative relationship between board tenure diversity and volatility is robust
when controlling for a set of control variables, fixed effects (e.g., country, industry, year,
and firm), and applying alternative model specifications. Further, a worldwide explosion
of corporate board reforms enables a shock-based research design (Atanasov and Black,
2016) that mitigates the endogeneity concerns inherent in examining cross sectional re-
lations between board composition and firm outcomes (Dahya and McConnell, 2007).5
Using the country-level staggered board reforms across the world, we employ a difference-
in-differences (DID) research design to estimate the effect of board composition changes
on firm risk. Consistent with our baseline approach, the DID results show that board
tenure diversity can lower the stock return volatility.
Board tenure diversity, however, may not be equally effective in reducing firm risk
across different institutional features. We propose that cultural difference, despite at an
institutional level, is an important moderator of the relationship between board tenure
diversity and firm risk, which requires cross-country analysis (Stulz and Williamson,
2003; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009; Gorodnichenko and Roland,
2011). Extant studies suggest that culture can help explain firms’ financial decisions, and
applying it to the board decision context can generate insights that might not be seen
using the traditional lens of corporate governance (e.g., Minichilli et al., 2012; Carter
5Following the issuance of the Cadbury report in the UK in 1992, the rest of the world has realized
the importance of corporate governance and many countries have launched corporate board reforms.
One of the aims of board reform is to increase the independence of boards of directors. To comply
with such reforms, listed companies have to replace some of their non-executive directors to meet the
newly launched corporate governance codes in their countries. Accordingly, the tenure composition of
their boards will alter exogenously, leading to different levels of diversity. We take advantage of the
exogenous changes in tenure diversity due to the board reforms and apply a DID strategy to mitigate
the endogeneity issues.
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et al., 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Culture affects perceptions, preferences, and
behaviors, and therefore the action outcomes and perceived utilities of financial decision
makers (such as boards of directors).
Specifically, the tenure diversity effect on firm risk can be significantly heterogeneous
between countries with the collectivistic culture and those with the individualistic culture.
As diversity increases the independence of a group, individualism makes it more difficult
for boards to reach effective decisions, thus manifesting risk (e.g., Gundlach et al., 2006).
Also, as tenure diversity means that the board is comprised of both senior and junior
members, the diversity effect might be weakened for those countries whose culture accepts
a higher degree of unequally distributed power. In those countries, it is more likely that
compromises will be made for power and seniority due to people’s obedience and respect
for authority (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010). In line with this intuition, our
empirical evidence suggests that the positive impact of board tenure diversity in reducing
firm risk is weakened in countries with higher individualism and power distance cultures,
due to the balancing act that occurs between group independence and cohesiveness.
Further, to shed light on the potential mechanisms through which board tenure di-
versity affects firm risk, we first subgroup firms depending on their average board tenure.
Both governance experts and market participants suspect that boards with many long-
tenured directors are aligned with CEOs, leading to a culture of undue deference to
management when making decisions (e.g., ISS 2013-2014 Policy Survey; Huang and Hi-
lary, 2018). Therefore, we argue that the diversity effect on firm risk should be more
pronounced among firms with longer average board tenures, which are more likely to
suffer board weak monitoring. Our empirical results support this argument. Next, we
investigate whether board diversity affects firms’ investment decisions that determine the
level of firm risk. The empirical evidence suggests that firms with greater board diversity
reduce their increases in investments in total assets, and also their level of investment in
capital expenditure, suggesting that a tenure-diverse board tends to adopt persistent and
cautious investment policies.
Our paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, we extend the
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literature that investigates the link between tenure diversity and board monitoring effec-
tiveness (Li and Wahid, 2018) by providing the first study to examine the link between
tenure diversity and firm risk. We also contribute to a broader literature that has doc-
umented the relations between firm risk and other corporate governance characteristics,
including CEO gender, financial expertise, ownership, compensation and the presence of
institutional investors (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Faccio et al., 2016; Kim and Lu, 2011;
Minton et al., 2014; Wahal and McConnell, 2000).
Second, a common challenge in research on culture and finance is that it is difficult
to distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of culture. Most empirical research
reflects the direct effect of a given cultural measure on financial decision outcomes, by
controlling for other firm- and/or country-level determinants (Li et al., 2013; El Ghoul
et al., 2016). However very few studies report findings on the mechanisms and intermedi-
ate channels through which culture affects financial decisions, that is, the indirect effects
of culture. We exploit the indirect effect of culture on corporate decisions by examining
its moderating role on the link between tenure diversity and firm risk, given the advantage
of the cross-country research context.
Third, although many studies have investigated the impact of other types of board
diversity on firm risk, they yield mixed evidence and focus mainly on the US market. For
example, Giannetti and Zhao (2019) find that directors’ ancestral origins diversity, as a
proxy for board opinion and value diversity, increases the volatility of firm performance.
In contrast, Bernile et al. (2018) use a multidimensional diversity index (including diver-
sity in gender, age, board seats, ethnicity, education, and financial work experience) and
find that board diversity leads to lower stock volatility. Our cross-country analysis allows
us to utilize the corporate board reforms as exogenous shocks to board composition, and
it reconciles the mixed findings in prior single-country diversity studies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the literature review
and hypothesis development. Section 3 provides the data and methodology. Section 4
presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses how culture moderates the baseline
relationship. Section 6 discusses the potential mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1 Board diversity and firm risk
Board diversity, i.e., heterogeneity among board members, encompasses a wide range
of dimensions, such as age, nationality, religion, gender, work experience, beliefs, and
preferences. The theoretical underpinning for board diversity studies stems from social
psychology studies and organization research on the effects of team diversity on group
decisions.
Previous research typically focuses on the link between board diversity and firm per-
formance (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Minton et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2011). More
recent studies have investigated the impact of board diversity on firm risk, but with
mixed evidence and mainly in the US market. For example, Sila et al. (2016) fail to doc-
ument a relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk.Giannetti and Zhao
(2019) proxy for board members’ opinions and values using directors’ ancestral origins
and show that diversity has costs and benefits, leading to higher performance volatility.
Specifically, firms with greater ancestral diversity have more board meetings and make
less predictable decisions. Bernile et al. (2018) use a multidimensional diversity index
with diversities of gender, age, board seats, ethnicity, education, and financial work expe-
rience) and find that board diversity leads to lower stock volatility. They also suggest that
the lower risk level is due to less risky financial policies and more efficient investments in
innovation adopted by diverse boards.
2.2 Board tenure diversity and firm risk
Despite the extensive media and political attention to multidimensional board diversity,
most empirical literature focuses on gender diversity, while there is far less studying other
dimensions (Bernile et al., 2018). More recently, some practitioners and regulators have
begun to put increasing attention on issues of board tenure. Director tenure is the length
of time a director has served on the corporate board. It signifies a director’s commitment,
experience, and competence in understanding firm-specific issues. It also influences the
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oversight of directors on CEOs, since extended service time may also make a director
more likely to be friends with the management at the cost of shareholders (Vafeas, 2003).
A limited number of studies have established links between board tenure diversity
and firm outcomes and policies. Among those, Vafeas (2003) finds that senior directors
who have served for twenty or more years are more likely to be on the firm’s nomination
and compensation committees, and lessen boards’ oversight of affiliated CEOs, which
highlights the limitations of longer director tenure. Huang and Hilary (2018) document an
inverted U-shaped relationship between the average board tenure and firm performance.
This relationship also holds between board tenure and other corporate decisions such
as M&As, CEO compensation, and the quality of financial reporting. Li and Wahid
(2018) show that board tenure diversity is positively related to CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity, while the tenure diversity of the audit committee (compensation committee)
is negatively related to accounting restatement (overcompensation). They support the
idea that board diversity could enhance the board’s monitoring performance, but do not
find strong evidence that board diversity contributes to a firm’s financial performance.
All these studies focus on the US market and show different impacts of board tenure
diversity on firm outcomes.
Board tenure diversity, like other diversity, could have both costs and benefits. Firm
risk increases with CEO power: powerful CEOs are capable of making unchecked de-
cisions, leading to more idiosyncratic choices that may result in extreme outcomes and
higher risk (Adams et al., 2005). Board of directors is the most important internal cor-
porate governance mechanism to oversee the CEO decisions.
On the one hand, the oversight function of long-tenured directors is more likely to be
problematic due to the ‘friendship’ built up between the CEO and directors. Specifically,
both executive and non-executive directors dislike haggling with or being ‘disloyal’ to the
CEO in case they need a number of favors from the CEO in the future. Bebchuk and
Fried (2004) provide a portrait of a director’s behavior: “the CEO can place them on the
company’s slate, increasing seriously their chance of re-election, give them perks, business
deals (perhaps after they have been nominated on the board, so that they are formally
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“independent”), extra compensation on top of the director fee, and charitable contributions
to nonprofit organizations headed by directors, or reciprocate the lenient oversight in case
of interlocking directorates”. Furthermore, a tenure-homogeneous team are more socially
cohesive (O’Reilly III et al., 1989), which may reduce the board’s monitoring effectiveness
due to compliancy and groupthink (Herman et al., 1982). We argue that homogeneity
of directors’ tenure lengths results in less scrutiny from the board in monitoring CEO’s
idiosyncratic decisions. The weakness of governance ultimately gives rise to more volatile
corporate outcomes. Thus, from this perspective, board tenure diversity reduces firm
risk.
On the other hand, as board members with different tenures can have heterogeneous
knowledge, opinions and views, issues such as conflict, lack of cooperation, and insufficient
communication can be common among the directors during the decision-making process
(Simons and Peterson, 2000; Van den Steen, 2010). In such circumstances, the decision
outcomes from directors can be even more uncertain and risky due to the difficulty of
attaining consensus (Arrow, 1951). This alternative view indicates that board diversity
yields higher rather than lower outcome volatility. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1a: board tenure diversity reduces firm risk.
Hypothesis 1b: board tenure diversity increases firm risk.
2.3 Culture, board tenure diversity and firm risk
In the economic and finance literature, culture has often been defined as “those customary
beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from
generation to generation” (Guiso et al., 2006). Due to the persistent feature of culture, it
is feasible to identify a causal effect from culture to economic outcomes. Previous research
mainly shows that cultural differences have strong power to explain the broad systemic
or structural economic differences across countries, such as credit rights and investor
protection (Stulz and Williamson, 2003), judicial efficiency (Radebaugh et al., 2006),
and corporate governance (Doidge et al., 2007). A growing body of finance research
also shows that culture matters for micro-level firm outcomes. Specifically, national
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culture impacts on a range of corporate and capital market behaviors, for example, liquid
asset holdings (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009), capital structure (Chui et al., 2002), and
earnings management (Han et al., 2010).
In particular, national culture could influence firm risk through the risk-oversight role
of the board of directors. To protect the interests of the shareholders/stakeholders, the
board of directors is introduced to monitor CEO power and moderate firm decisions (Fama
and Jensen, 1983). The structure of the board, like any organizational structure, can be
influenced by national culture. Institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMag-
gio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) views organizations as seeking legitimacy, resources,
and ultimately survival by conforming their structures to institutional norms. In turn,
the psychological and organizational literature (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004) docu-
ments that social and cultural norms, as a part of institutional norms, have an important
impact on governance structure. For example, in the UK corporate governance system,
the shareholders (the board of directors) are the only controlling parties. However in
Germany, banks and employee representatives play a significant role in decision-making
for public firms because German companies are seen as a coordinating vehicle between
national interest groups (Cromme, 2005). In addition to the impact of regulatory design,
empirical evidence shows that national culture explains variations in board structure
across countries. Li and Harrison (2008) find that national culture can influence board
composition and leadership structure. Firms in countries that place a higher value on
individualism or have a higher power distance tend to have a higher proportion of non-
executive directors, and also CEO duality. Carrasco et al. (2015) show that countries
with a greater tolerance for inequalities in the distribution of power and that value the
role of men more highly, generally present lower proportions of female directors on their
board. Thus, national culture could explain variations in board diversity in different
dimensions.
Besides, national culture has a direct impact on the decision-making process of boards
of directors. Culture provides a “framework for encoding and interpreting the information
that the senses are presenting to the brain” (North, 1990). According to psychological
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studies, culture shapes individual behaviors in everyday life and may help us to under-
stand these behaviors (Hofstede, 1980). It also shapes the majority of social practices
and processes (House et al., 2004). Members of a board will often live in the same coun-
try, thus sharing common values, beliefs, principles, and attitudes. Some dimensions of
national culture could, therefore, impact the directors’ behaviors and further smooth (dis-
turb) the decision process of boards, resulting in high (low) board effectiveness. Minichilli
et al. (2012) find that national culture moderates the links between the board decision
process and board monitoring performance, by comparing survey-based firm data from
Norway (representing Scandinavian countries) and Italy (representing Latin countries).
Building on these strands of literature, we aim to investigate whether and to what extent
the culture of a country moderates the impact that board tenure diversity has on firm
risk.
In most empirical studies, researchers make theoretical claims as to how certain cul-
tural values influence the financial decisions of individuals (Delis and Mylonidis, 2015),
firm managers (Jiang et al., 2015), or government officials (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).
However, empirical results simply reflect the direct effect of a given cultural measure on
the financial decision outcome of interest, controlling for other firm- and/or country-level
determinants. Few studies report findings on the mechanisms and intermediate channels
through which culture affects financial decisions, that is, the indirect effects of culture.
By testing the theorized links between group (board) diversity and national culture, our
study provides more evidence on these channels and indirect impact on firm outcomes.
In cross-country studies on culture and finance, most scholars utilize the datasets
developed by Hofstede, Schwartz, GLOBE, and the World Values Survey (WVS). Among
these four datasets, Hofstede’s is the earliest and most widely cited, which has been
adopted in this study. Following psychology literature, we argue that two dimensions
of culture from Hofstede’s index (2010), individualism/collectivism and power distance,
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may influence board/group work efficiency.6
Individualism/Collectivism. Individualism/collectivism is the degree to which people
in a society are integrated into groups (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010). On
the individualistic side, where the ties between people are loose, individuals are expected
to care for themselves and their immediate family, thus tending to place personal interests
over shared group goals (Wagner III, 1995). On the collectivist side, where people are
integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups from birth onwards, individuals are expected
to care for group welfare, equality, and loyalty (Hofstede, 2001; Schuler and Rogovsky,
1998). Empirical research often shows that individualistic team members exert a nega-
tive influence on team performance (Gundlach et al., 2006). The social identity theory
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989) argues that a team of individualistic members will barely de-
velop team identification in attempting to achieve group goals. The social relation model
(Kenny, 1994) explains that the negative relationship between individualism and team
performance is due to the high communication costs based on inaccurate meta-perceptions
in individualistic societies. Wendt et al. (2009) suggest that the individualistic culture
has an indirect impact on team cohesiveness. In a country with higher individualism,
board members are more likely to consider their values and positions within the group,
rather than taking care of the group’s interests. Thus, the conflicts between junior and
senior board directors will be exacerbated in individualistic culture such that tenure di-
versity will increase the communication costs of boards, then make it more challenging
to achieve predictable team decisions and outcomes. Therefore, we propose the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: If Hypothesis 1a holds, the individualistic culture could reduce the
impact of board tenure diversity on firm risk.
Hypothesis 2b: If Hypothesis 1b holds, the individualistic culture could increase the
impact of board tenure diversity on firm risk.
6The other four dimensions of culture are uncertainty avoidance (the level of stress in a society in
the face of an unknown future), masculinity versus femininity (the division of emotional roles between
women and men), long-term versus short-term orientation (the choice of focus for people’s efforts: the
future or the present and past), and indulgence versus restraint (the gratification versus control of basic
human desires related to enjoying life). We did not consider these four dimensions of culture since it is
not clear how they might be linked to board diversity.
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Power distance. Power distance means “the extent to which the less powerful members
of institutions and organizations expect and accept that power is distributed unequally”
(Hofstede, 2001). It implies the extent to which team leaders and followers endorse
inequality in a team. In high-power-distance cultures, organizations tend to be centralized
with power concentrated in a few hands; and large differences in authority, salary, and
privileges are exhibited between those at the top and the bottom. In low-power-distance
cultures, organizations are more decentralized; there is more consultation in decision-
making; independent action by less powerful actors is valued and encouraged (Hodgetts
and Luthans, 1993). Building on evidence from strategic decision making, it is possible
that power inequality within the board may either have either negative or positive effects
on organizational outcomes. In terms of negative consequences, board power inequality
can reduce information sharing within the team, reducing the creativity of ideas generated
and quality of choices made, and can hurt the ability to implement decisions. In terms
of positive consequences, powerful members can create decision-making processes that
are efficient, informed, fair, and that lead to quality decisions that enhance a firm’s
performance. In line with the positive effect, Smith et al. (2006) use survey data from 51
US hospitals and find that the CEO is the most powerful leader in the top management
teams (TMTs), and that power distance within the TMTs is positively related to firm
performance. They argue that unequal power distribution among TMT members may
lead to efficient and fair decision-making processes. In contrast, using data from Chinese
listed firms, Zhu et al. (2016) suggest that increasing the power of independent directors
leads to more effective monitoring and higher firm value. In countries with higher power
distance, the long-tenured directors in a firm are more likely to be the power center, and
their ideas will be valued more highly by the board. Thus, a diverse board’s decisions
will be influenced by the longer-tenured directors. Therefore, we propose the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: If Hypothesis 1a holds, the high power distance culture could reduce
the impact of board tenure diversity on firm risk.
Hypothesis 3b: If Hypothesis 1b holds, the high power distance culture could increase
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the impact of board tenure diversity on firm risk.
3 Sample, data, and research design
3.1 Sample and data
We start by collecting financial and accounting information for listed firms across the
world from 1999 to 2017. The data are downloaded from the Worldscope data in Datas-
tream, Thomson Reuters. Then we obtain board and corporate governance data from
BoardEx. Country-level characteristics are downloaded from the World Development In-
dex by the World Bank. Financial and utility firms are excluded from the sample, since
regulations in these industries are different from those in other sectors. Furthermore,
countries with less than twenty firms are dropped from the sample. Our analysis are less
likely to suffer from survivorship bias because Worldscope provide datasets that include
acquired and delisted firms. We construct a large global panel of approximately 86,696
firm-year observations of 12,935 firms across 37 countries. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the top and bottom one percent.
3.2 Measures of firm risk, board tenure diversity and national
culture
Following previous literature on firm risk (e.g., Bernile et al., 2018; Sila et al., 2016), we
use Volatility, measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the given
year, as the main proxy for firm risk.7
Following prior organization studies (e.g., Harrison and Klein, 2007), we use the co-
efficient of variation (the standard deviation over the mean) of board member tenure
7Following Favara et al. (2017), we further measure the firm’s idiosyncratic risk as annualized standard
deviation of the residuals from the regression of the firm’s weekly stock returns in year t on the world
market index (lag, lead, and contemporaneous). For every firm in the sample, we regress a firm’s weekly
stock returns in year t on the lagged, contemporaneous, and lead world market index return and compute
idiosyncratic risk as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals. Appendix B reports summary
statistics of idiosyncratic risk and provides the regression results for the relationship between board
tenure diversity and firm idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient on board tenure diversity is similar to the
ones using total risk. We use MSCI world equity index as the market index to decompose the total risk.
13
lengths to measure board tenure diversity throughout our study.8 Following the litera-
ture looking at national culture in finance studies (see Karolyi, 2016), we adopt Hofstede’s
framework for measuring national culture, specifically focusing on individualism/collec-
tivism and power distance (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010). A higher score
for individualism/collectivism indicates that the country’s culture is more individualistic,
and a higher score for power distance indicates that the country values authority more.
Table 1 presents the distribution of firms, observations, cultural measures and board
reform years across countries. The overall sample distribution is similar to those in
previous studies using the BoardEx and Worldscope databases (Dong et al., 2019). Table
1 also provides the scores of individualism/collectivism and power distance from Hofstede
et al. (2010) for our sample countries. We group the sample countries into two categories,
based on the median score for individualism/collectivism. Countries with a score above 60
are defined as high individualism countries, and the rest as low individualism countries.
We similarly divide the countries into two groups based on their power distance scores:
high power distance countries are those with a score above the median value of 54, and
the rest are low power distance countries. The distribution of board reform years on
country-level is based on Fauver et al. (2017).
[Table 1 about here.]
3.3 Model specification
To test the relation between board tenure diversity and firm risk, we use panel data
regression analysis. The baseline model is as follows:




βnFE + ε (1)
where i denotes firm and t denotes year. As discussed above, we use Volatility, defined
as the standard deviation of daily returns in a year, as our measure of firm risk. The
8We also use the standard deviation of director tenure lengths as an alternative measure for robustness
purposes. The results are qualitatively the same.
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coefficient of variation of board tenure lengths is our primary measure of Board tenure
diversity. The acceptance of Hypothesis 1a (1b) requires the coefficient on Board tenure
diversity, β1, to be negative (positive). All regressions include year, country, and two-digit
SIC industry fixed effects with robust standard errors.9
For the control variables, we include other board-level, firm-level, and country-level
variables that have been documented to affect firm risk in prior studies (e.g., Bernile et al.,
2018; Sila et al., 2016). To control for other board characteristics, we include the average
tenure length of the directors (Board tenure), the natural logarithm of total number of
directors on the board (Board size), the proportion of non-executive directors on the
board (Board independence), the proportion of female directors (Gender diversity), the
proportion of foreign directors (Ethnic diversity), the standard deviation of the number of
directorships in other listed firms, held by the directors (Board experience diversity), the
standard deviation of directors’ ages (Board age diversity), and an indicator of whether
the CEO chairs the board (CEO duality) in the regressions. To control for the influence of
firm-level factors, we include firm accounting performance (ROA), the natural logarithm
of the book value of total assets (Firm size), tangible assets over total assets (Tangibility),
the increase in sales over the previous year’s sales (Sales growth), financial inflow stability
proxied by the ratio of funds from operations to net sales (Cash flow), and the market-to-
book value of total assets (MB), following Sila et al. (2016). To control for country-level
factors that influence firm risk, we include ability to access finance in a country, i.e. the
stock market value over GDP (Stock market value), the natural logarithm of GDP per
capita (Log(GDP)), and government consumption as percentage of GDP (Government
stability), following Gu et al. (2019). Appendix A provides detailed variable definitions.
To examine whether national culture affects the sensitivity of firm risk to board tenure
diversity, we expand our regression model as below:
9We also re-categorize the SIC industry into the Fama-French 49 industry, then control for Fama-
French 49 industry fixed effects in the baseline regression. Further, we add country-by-industry fixed
effects in the baseline model to consider different industrial policies within a country. The results are
robust with the ones using SIC two-digit industry fixed effects. See Appendix C for the results.
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Firm riski,t =α + β1Board tenure diversityi,t + β2Culture dummyi,t







where i denote firm and t denotes year. The culture dummy takes two different defi-
nitions, in two separate regressions: the Individualism dummy equals one when people
in a country tend to be less likely to give up their ideas to aid group coherence (these
countries have been tagged with “H” in Table 1 column (5)), and zero otherwise. The
Power distance dummy takes the value one when the country has a higher tolerance for
inequality of power, indicating that the voices of less powerful members may not be valued
(these countries have been tagged with “H” in Table 1 column (6)), and zero otherwise.
Throughout all model specifications, we include the same set of control variables as in
Eq. (1).
The coefficient of the interaction term, Board tenure diversity × Culture dummy, β3,
indicates how national culture moderates the effect of board tenure diversity on firm risk.
The interpretation of β3 largely depends on whether Hypothesis 1a or 1b is accepted in
Eq. (1) and we will discuss it in later sections.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. It shows
that the mean (median) firm risk, measured as the standard deviation of daily stock
returns (Volatility (%)), is 34.091% (32.241%). We are aware that our sample comprises
relatively large listed companies (the average value of assets is 1,102 million US dollars;
the median is 982 million US dollars).10 The average value of Board tenure diversity
is 0.651 and the standard deviation is 0.260, suggesting the variation in the tenures
of board members is not negligible. The standard deviation of directors’ tenure lengths
(Board tenure diversity_std) also display large firm-level variations with a means of 4.872
and a standard deviation 3.260. Table 2 also shows the summary statistics for other
board-level, firm-level, and country-level controls, which are largely consistent with the
10We obtain the data for total assets (Field 07230 Total Assets (US$)) from Worldscope. According
to Worldscope’s Data Definitions Guide, Total Assets (US$) represent the total assets of the company
converted to US dollars using the fiscal year end exchange rate. Thus, the total assets across different
countries are all nominated in US dollars.
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cross-country research. For example, using a large sample from 71 countries, Dong et al.
(2019) document that average values of board size and board independence are 8.68 and
0.76, which are quantitatively the same as ours (In Table 2, the average values of the
natural logarithm of board size and board independence are 2.163 and 0.702).
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 3 reports the correlations between the variables. It shows that firm risk is
negatively associated with the board tenure diversity measures. In line with the literature,
firm risk is also negatively related to the other diversity measures of gender diversity,
ethnic diversity, and experience diversity, but not to age diversity. Table 3 indicates that
our study is less likely to be plagued with multicollinearity problem.
[Table 3 about here.]
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Board tenure diversity and firm risk: baseline regressions
In the main analysis, we examine the relationship between board tenure diversity and
firm risk. Table 4 reports the baseline regression results. Column (1) reports the regres-
sion results for our key independent variable, i.e., board tenure diversity, other board
characteristics, i.e., board tenure, size, board independence, CEO duality, and firm-level
controls, are regressed on firm risk. In column (2), we further include other types of
board diversity that influence firm risk: gender, ethnicity, experience, and age diversities.
Institutional environments, such as economic growth, ability to access financing, and
government policies, may affect firm risk at a country level. In column (3), we include
GDP per capita, Stock market value, and Government stability to capture the differences
in institutional environments across countries. Across all the columns of Table 4, the
estimated coefficients on Board tenure diversity are negatively related to stock volatility
at the 1% significance level. Our empirical evidence suggests that board tenure diversity
can lower firm risk.
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We also find that the coefficients of Board size are significantly negative at the 1%
level, across all specifications. It is consistent with Wang (2012), who uses US data,
and suggests that smaller boards motivate CEOs to take on a more risky investment,
eventually causing the overall firm risk to rise. The coefficient on Board independence is
significantly negative as well, in line with the findings of Minton et al. (2010) using US
data.
With regard to the firm-level control variables, firm risk is negatively correlated to
firm size, performance, cash flow, and tangibility, while it is positively associated with
leverage and sales growth. These results are generally in line with the literature (Bernile
et al., 2018; Faccio et al., 2016; Minton et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016).
Overall, the evidence discussed in this section indicates that board tenure diversity
has a negative effect on firm risk, supporting the idea that tenure-diverse boards will
make more moderate firm decisions, resulting in lower volatility. The empirical evidence
indicates that we should accept Hypothesis 1a that board tenure diversity reduces firm
risk.
[Table 4 about here.]
4.2 Robustness tests
We are aware that our main results may suffer from the following potential issues. First,
the relation between board tenure diversity and firm risk may be spurious because both
factors may be correlated with time-invariant firm factors, such as CEO management
style and corporate culture. Second, according to the summary statistics, the US data
account for around 45% of the full sample, raising the concern that the US data may
drive our results.
Table 5 provides regressions results with firm fixed effects, as an alternative model
specification, and for a sample excluding the US data, respectively. With the firm fixed
effects model, we repeat the regressions in Table 4 for the full sample and the sample
excluding the US data, and the results are presented in columns (1) and (3) respectively.
Columns (2) and (4) show the regression results when we use the standard deviation
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of director tenure lengths (Board tenure diversity_std) as the key independent variable,
for the two samples. Standard deviation is a measure of the separation of observations
from the mean, emphasizing the combination of senior and young directors on a board,
regardless of the average board tenure, and is also used to measure diversity (Harrison
and Klein, 2007). We continue to find that board tenure diversity is negatively correlated
with stock return volatility for both samples, after controlling for the firm fixed effects.
Therefore, the negative association between tenure diversity and firm risk is not due to the
correlation between time-invariant components of the board and corporate characteristics,
or not due to a large amount of US data in our sample.
[Table 5 about here.]
For other types of board diversity, the results are mixed across specifications and
samples compared to Table 4. After controlling for firm-level time-invariant factors with
firm fixed effects, the relationship between gender diversity and firm risk is not signifi-
cant in either the full sample or the sample excluding the US data, consistent with Sila
et al. (2016)’s findings using US data. Table 5 also shows that the coefficients on Board
experience diversity are not significant for the non-US sample. These results are similar
to the findings of Bernile et al. (2018) for the US market.
4.3 Endogeneity issue: difference-in-differences design
The results in Table 4 and Table 5 are still subject to endogeneity issues between board
structure and firm outcomes. Precisely, omitted time-varying factors could determine
both board composition and firm risk simultaneously. We further mitigate the endogene-
ity concerns with a difference-in-differences (DID) design in this section. A worldwide
explosion of corporate board reforms in recent years allows us to apply a shock-based re-
search design (Atanasov and Black, 2016) that mitigates the endogeneity concerns inher-
ent in examining cross-sectional relations between board composition and firm outcomes
(Dahya and McConnell, 2007). Using the country-level board reforms across the world,
we employ a DID research design to estimate the effect of board composition changes on
firm risk.
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Following the issuing of the Cadbury report in the UK in 1992, the rest of the world
realized the importance of corporate governance, and many countries have launched cor-
porate board reforms (Dahya and McConnell, 2007). One of the key aims of board
reform is to increase the independence of the board of directors.11 Listed companies have
to replace some of their non-executive directors to meet the newly launched corporate
governance codes in their countries following such reforms. Thus, the tenure diversity of a
board will alter accordingly, and the changes in tenure diversity are exogenous. Therefore,
we use a DID design to examine how the board reforms affect firm risk.
Post is an indicator taking the value one when the year is later than the board reform
year occurred in a given country, and zero otherwise, which captures the exogenous
shocks of corporate board reforms. Because different countries have conducted reforms at
different times, our setting contains multiple treatment groups (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). Then, we interact Board tenure diversity with Post, and the coefficient on the
interaction term captures the effect on the firm risk of the sudden increase in board
tenure diversity due to the regulation change. We include country and year fixed effects
to identify the within-firm and within-year changes in firm risk between treatment and
benchmark firms. Industry dummies are included to control for industrial characteristics.
The benchmark group consists solely of firms from countries that have not experienced
reforms as of a particular time. To mitigate concerns about confounding events, we
restrict our sample period to windows spanning from 3 (or 6) years before to 3 (or 6)
years after the reforms. This approach is commonly used in previous literature (Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2003). We obtain 24,380 firm-year observations for the [-3, 3] window
and 39,341 for the [-6, 6] window.
Table 6 presents the results of the DID analysis of how the board reforms and conse-
quent increases in board tenure diversity affect firm risk. Columns (1) and (2) present the
results using the [-3, 3] and [-6, 6] windows, respectively. We find that the coefficient on
Post is positively significant in the short [-3, 3] window (column (1)), while it is not signif-
icant in the long [-6, 6] window (column (2)). These results imply that the board reform,
11Using data from 41 countries and a DID design,Fauver et al. (2017) find that board reforms have a
positive impact on firm value.
20
itself, may increase firm risk in the short run but not in the long run because investors
or firms will need time to adjust to the exogenous policy change. More importantly, the
coefficients on the interaction term, Board tenure diversity × Post, are negatively signif-
icant. It indicates that, when compared to the benchmark firms, the increase in tenure
diversity due to the policy change could reduce firm risk in the treatment firms. Overall,
the results of the DID design are consistent with our results in Tables 4 and 5, suggesting
that the board tenure diversity has a negative effect on firm risk.
[Table 6 about here.]
We further use propensity score matching (PSM) to reduce the differences in observ-
able characteristics between treatment and control groups. For each treatment firm, we
follow recent literature to match it with the benchmark firm annually (e.g., Faulkender
and Yang, 2013; Jaravel et al., 2018). We include all firm level characteristics and coun-
try level characteristics for matching, including ROA, Firm size, Sales growth, Cash flow,
MB, Tangibility, Leverage, Log(GDP), Stock market value, and Government stability to
capture the firm and country heterogeneity. We apply a strict caliper distance (0.001)
to ensure that all differences in matching dimensions are erased. Nonetheless, because of
our international setting, it is relatively more difficult to find cross-country benchmark
firms, which results in a loss of observations. Consequently, the PSM sample in [-3, 3]
window is 15,784 observations, and the sample in [-6, 6] window is 18,030 observations.
We perform a difference-in-differences test using the PSM samples. Appendix D shows
the results. The interactions between board tenure diversity and post are still significant
and negative, which indicates that our results are consistent with those without matching
in Table 6.
5 Culture, board tenure diversity, and firm risk
This section reports the results of whether and how national culture moderates the neg-
ative relationship between board tenure diversity and firm risk. From the institutional
perspective, human and social behaviors are driven by country-level institutions, such as
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norms, routines, and historical patterns, which determine isomorphism among individu-
als and organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus, national culture could explain
variations in group dynamics, which further impact on the board decision-making pro-
cess, specifically the effectiveness of the board in risk oversight, and thus on firm risk.
Based on our main results that board tenure diversity can reduce firm risk, we expect
that some national culture dimensions could reduce the sensitivity of firm risk to board
diversity if the culture negatively impacted the board’s effectiveness in monitoring, which
could be the case in cultures with high individualism and respect for power.
Table 7 reports the regression results for culture, board tenure diversity and firm risk,
with the Individualism dummy and Power distance dummy as the culture dummies in
columns (1) and (2) respectively. First, the coefficient on Individualism dummy is nega-
tively significant, while the coefficient on Power distance dummy is positively significant.
This indicates that countries’ cultural differences in terms of individualism and power
distance may have direct effects on firm risk, after controlling for country-level determi-
nants. The extant literature has briefly studied the relation between culture and firm
risk taking, but has mostly focused on firms in the banking and the financial sectors
(Houston et al., 2010; Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Li and Zahra, 2012). For example,
Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) show that aggressive risk-taking activities by banks are more
likely in societies with high individualism. In a similar vein, Li et al. (2013) show that
individualism is positively associated with firm-level riskiness in the nonfinancial sector
(in the manufacturing sector). Their results are largely consistent with our findings.
[Table 7 about here.]
More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term between Board tenure diver-
sity and Individualism dummy is significantly positive, as is that on the interaction term
between Board tenure diversity and Power distance dummy. These results suggest that
the negative effect of board tenure diversity on firm risk is attenuated when a country’s
culture is more individualistic or power distance oriented, which are consistent with Hy-
pothesis 2a and 3a that if Hypothesis 1a holds, the individualistic and high power culture
could both reduce the impact of board tenure diversity on firm risk.
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Further, this set of results helps alleviate a few endogeneity concerns. First, the
nature of culture is persistent at the country level, making it unlikely that the relationship
between firm risk and culture is driven by reverse causality or a latent variable. Second,
it is less likely that our results are driven by unspecified omitted variables, given that
we have controlled for firm, industry, and country fixed effects to mitigate the omitted
variable bias in all regressions, as is common in cross-country studies. The findings
support our hypothesis that culture is an important moderator of the relationship between
firm risk and board tenure diversity.
6 Possible mechanisms
6.1 Board tenure diversity and firm risk: does the average tenure
matter?
Both governance experts and market participants suspect that boards with many long-
tenured directors are not independent from the management, leading to a culture of
undue deference to management when making decisions (e.g., ISS 2013-2014 Policy Sur-
vey; Huang and Hilary, 2018). For example, senior directors who have been serving a
company for over twenty years are more likely to be on the firm’s nominating and compen-
sation committees (Vafeas, 2003). However, the long board service time helps directors
obtain corporate-specific information, signifying their commitment to, experience in, and
competence at serving the company. These competing arguments raise an important
question regarding board governance: how might a board’s independence and knowledge
be balanced through a particular composition of board tenures?
A potential answer to the question might be obtained by focusing on board tenure
diversity, allowing the long-tenured directors to provide business-specific information and
the short-tenured to play a more restrictive role in monitoring the CEO. Huang and Hilary
(2018) show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U-shaped relation with firm value and
accounting performance. This is consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on-the-
job learning improves firm value up to a threshold point, beyond which weak monitoring
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dominates and firm performance is damaged. Thus, we expect that the relationship
between board tenure diversity and firm risk is not linear, and the diversity effect on firm
risk should be more pronounced among firms with longer average board tenures, which
are more likely to suffer from board weak monitoring.
Table 8 presents the regression results from examining whether the effect of board
tenure diversity is stronger when the average board member tenure is longer. We first
calculate three median values: (1) the median of board tenure by industry and year, (2)
the median by year, (3) the median by country and year, and (4) the median by country,
industry and year at the same time. We define long-tenure dummies taking the value one
when the board tenure is above each of these respective medians, and zero otherwise: (1)
Long tenure dummy (industry & year), (2) Long tenure dummy (year), (3) Long tenure
dummy (country & year), and (4) Long tenure dummy (country & industry & year).
Then, we conduct the analysis by interacting the board tenure diversity with the long-
tenure dummies, with the results presented in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) respectively.
As shown in Table 8, the coefficients on board tenure diversity are still negative, consistent
with the baseline results. The coefficients on Long tenure dummy (industry & year), Long
tenure dummy (year) and Long tenure dummy (country & industry & year)are positively
significant, whereas that on Long tenure dummy (country & year) is not significant. More
importantly, the coefficients on all the interaction terms between board tenure diversity
and the long tenure dummies are significantly negative, suggesting that the effect of board
tenure diversity on firm risk is stronger in firms with longer average board tenure, which
are more likely to suffer from board weak monitoring.
[Table 8 about here.]
6.2 Board tenure diversity and corporate policies
Overall, our results suggest that board tenure diversity could enhance board monitoring
of firm risk. Next, we investigate the channel through which firm risk is reduced by
examining whether board tenure diversity affects a firm’s policies. We focus on two types
of corporate policies, i.e., investment and financial policies. The Investment, defined as
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the increase in total investment over last year’s value, and CAPEX, defined as the total
capital expenditure over total assets, are used as proxies for investment policies. Leverage,
measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets, is used as a proxy for financial policies.
Table 9 reports the results of regressing firms’ policies on their boards’ tenure diversity.
The dependent variables are Investment, CAPEX, and Leverage, in columns (1)-(3) ,
respectively. The coefficients on Board tenure diversity with respect to Investment and
CAPEX are significantly negative (columns (1) and (2)). This implies that board tenure
diversity helps reduce firm risk through a decrease in the risk related to investment.
In contrast, the coefficient on Board tenure diversity is not significant in the Leverage
model (column (3)), suggesting that tenure diversity does not affect the financial policy
significantly. Matsa and Miller (2013) show similar evidence when studying the impact of
female quotas for corporate board seats, in that gender diversity is not related to financial
risk either. Overall, our evidence suggests that board tenure diversity tends to lower firm
risk by causing firms to be more cautious and less risky in their investment.
[Table 9 about here.]
7 Conclusion
A growing interest of researchers, practitioners and regulators is to promote board diver-
sity in various forms, due to the belief that it enhances the oversight and monitoring of
directors. We focus on the effect of board tenure diversity on firm risk, globally, which
has yet to be examined in the board literature.
We explore the effect of board tenure diversity on firm risk using a panel of 86,696
firm-year observations from 12,935 firms across 37 countries from 1999 to 2017. Our
results show that firm risk is negatively associated with board tenure diversity. The
findings support the idea that board tenure diversity increases the board’s effectiveness
on risk oversight. This effect is more pronounced among firms with longer board tenures,
which are more likely to suffer from board weak monitoring. We address the endogeneity
issues with the DID approach, facilitated by the staggered corporate board reforms that
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have been implemented across the world. By taking advantage of the cross-country data,
we find that cultures with higher individualism and power distance weaken the effect of
board tenure diversity, through their influence on the board decision-making process, in
particular in reducing high-risk investment.
We are also aware that board diversity displays in many forms (e.g., gender, back-
ground, and experience, etc.). In some cases, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of
any single diversity on firm decisions and outcomes apart from others. In future research,
it is worth exploring more comprehensive measures of board diversity. Also, our study
does not use the other four dimensions of culture because it is not clear how they might
be linked to board diversity. The other four dimensions of culture include uncertainty
avoidance (the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future), masculinity
vs femininity (the division of emotional roles between women and men), long term vs
short term orientation (the choice of focus for people’s efforts: the future or the present
and past), and indulgence vs restraint (the gratification versus control of basic human
desires related to enjoying life). It is also interesting that we can connect other cultures
with board diversity in the future.
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Table 1: Distribution of firms, observations, cultural measures and board reform years,
by country
Country Firms Obs. Percent Individualism/Collectivism Power distance Board reform year
Australia 718 3,837 4.43 90(H) 36(L) 2004
Austria 36 281 0.32 55(L) 11(L) 2004
Belgium 88 730 0.84 75(H) 65(H) 2005
Brazil 94 547 0.63 38(L) 69(H) NA
Canada 691 3,842 4.43 80(H) 39(L) 2004
China 351 1,748 2.02 20(L) 80(H) 2001
Denmark 39 353 0.41 74(H) 18(L) 2001
Finland 57 446 0.51 63(H) 33(L) 2004
France 435 3,656 4.22 71(H) 68(H) 2003
Germany 341 2,533 2.92 67(H) 35(L) 2002
Greece 49 375 0.43 35(L) 60(H) 2002
Hong Kong 415 1,796 2.07 25(L) 68(H) 2005
India 389 2,183 2.52 48(L) 77(H) 2002
Ireland 66 485 0.56 70(H) 28(L) NA
Israel 110 772 0.89 54(L) 13(L) 2000
Italy 129 999 1.15 76(H) 50(L) 2006
Japan 273 1,088 1.25 46(L) 54(L) 2002
Luxembourg 25 174 0.20 60(L) 40(L) NA
Malaysia 149 696 0.80 26(L) 104(H) 2001
Mexico 53 294 0.34 30(L) 81(H) 2001
Netherlands 137 1,097 1.27 80(H) 38(L) 2004
New Zealand 51 225 0.26 79(H) 22(L) NA
Norway 115 829 0.96 69(H) 31(L) 2005
Philippines 29 175 0.20 32(H) 94(H) 2002
Poland 25 157 0.18 60(L) 68(H) 2002
Portugal 34 293 0.34 27(L) 63(H) 2001
Russia 54 248 0.29 39(L) 93(H) NA
Singapore 218 1,099 1.27 20(L) 74(H) 2003
South Africa 173 1,057 1.22 65(H) 49(L) NA
Spain 113 822 0.95 51(L) 57(H) 2006
Sweden 165 1,378 1.59 71(H) 31(L) 2006
Switzerland 138 1,061 1.22 68(H) 34(L) 2002
Thailand 36 154 0.18 20(L) 64(H) 2002
United Arab Emirates 22 81 0.09 38(L) 80(H) NA
Turkey 25 143 0.16 37(L) 66(H) 2002
United Kingdom 1,880 11,985 13.83 89(H) 35(L) 1998
United States 5,212 39,057 45.05 91(H) 40(L) 2003
This table displays the distribution of firms, observations, cultural measures and board reform years across countries.
Cultural measures include individualism/collectivism and power distance scores for each country based on Hofstede et al.
(2010). H/L in parentheses indicates whether the respective value is higher or lower than the median value across the
sample. Board reform year displays the year in which the board reform was adopted by each country, based on Fauver
et al. (2017).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable N mean std p25 median p75
Main variables
Volatility (%) 86,696 34.091 12.458 24.482 32.241 42.252
Board tenure diversity 86,696 0.651 0.260 0.482 0.645 0.814
Board tenure diversity_std 86,696 4.872 3.260 2.500 4.200 6.500
Leverage 86,696 0.502 0.221 0.341 0.509 0.655
Investment 83,257 0.044 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.012
CAPEX 83,864 15.680 101.907 5.318 9.036 15.554
Board-level controls
Board tenure 86,696 7.445 4.009 4.571 6.650 9.464
Board size 86,696 2.163 0.393 1.946 2.197 2.485
Board independence 86,696 0.702 0.175 0.600 0.714 0.857
Gender diversity 86,696 0.104 0.115 0.000 0.091 0.167
Ethnic diversity 86,696 0.143 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.300
Board experience diversity 86,696 0.956 0.695 0.500 0.900 1.300
Board age diversity 86,696 7.797 2.747 6.000 7.600 9.500
CEO duality 86,696 0.175 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm-level controls
ROA 86,696 0.027 0.136 0.010 0.050 0.088
Firm size 86,696 20.821 2.488 19.073 20.705 22.468
Tangibility 86,696 0.279 0.239 0.081 0.209 0.426
Sales growth 86,696 12.399 37.812 -1.791 6.671 17.609
Cash flow 86,696 8.744 30.730 4.296 9.849 17.611
MB 86,696 2.679 3.018 1.125 1.897 3.238
Country-level controls
Log(GDP) 86,696 10.554 0.692 10.607 10.771 10.819
Stock market value 86,696 1.360 1.450 0.896 1.239 1.383
Government stability 86,696 17.190 3.511 15.083 16.855 19.540































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Board tenure diversity and firm risk
(1) (2) (3)
Board tenure diversity -1.162*** -1.049*** -1.014***
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128)
Board tenure -0.604*** -0.616*** -0.617***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Board size -3.340*** -3.587*** -3.617***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
Board independence -1.854*** -2.518*** -2.583***
(0.229) (0.232) (0.232)
Gender diversity -5.580*** -5.728***
(0.318) (0.319)
Ethnic diversity 2.232*** 2.186***
(0.156) (0.156)
Board experience diversity 0.409*** 0.409***
(0.053) (0.053)
Board age diversity 0.225*** 0.225***
(0.012) (0.012)
CEO duality 0.516*** 0.525*** 0.524***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
ROA -17.604*** -17.009*** -17.029***
(0.313) (0.313) (0.313)
Firm size -2.116*** -2.123*** -2.112***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Sales growth 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash flow -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MB -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.106***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Tangibility -2.303*** -2.210*** -2.236***
(0.174) (0.173) (0.172)








Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 86,696 86,696 86,696
R2 0.492 0.498 0.499
This table provides the baseline OLS regression results for the relationship between board tenure diversity and firm risk.
The dependent variable is firm risk, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a year. Board tenure diversity
is the coefficient of variation of directors’ tenure lengths. Board tenure is the average tenure length of the directors. Board
size is the natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. Board independence, Gender diversity, and Ethnic
diversity are the proportions of non-executive, female, and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board experience
diversity is the standard deviation of the number of directorships in any firm, held by directors in the listed firm. Board
age diversity is the standard deviation of directors’ ages. CEO duality is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO also
chairs the board, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Firm size is the natural logarithm of
the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the natural logarithm of the current year’s sales minus the natural logarithm
of the previous year’s sales. Cash flow is the ratio of funds from operations to net sales. MB is the market value of total
assets divided by the book value of total assets. Tangibility is Net PPE divided by the value of total assets. Leverage is
the ratio of the book value of debt to total assets. Log(GDP) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Stock market
value is the market capitalization of all the listed companies in the country, as a proportion of GDP. Government Stability
is government consumption as a proportion of GDP. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include industry, country, and year fixed effects. All variable definitions are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5: Firm risk and board tenure diversity: firm fixed effects regression results
Full sample Non-US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board tenure diversity -0.429*** -0.251**
(0.095) (0.116)
Board tenure diversity_std -0.082*** -0.049***
(0.013) (0.018)
Board tenure -0.397*** -0.354*** -0.378*** -0.351***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Board size -1.400*** -1.370*** -1.151*** -1.139***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.141) (0.141)
Board independence -1.718*** -1.695*** -0.859*** -0.853***
(0.213) (0.213) (0.270) (0.270)
Gender diversity -0.262 -0.224 0.120 0.145
(0.268) (0.268) (0.315) (0.315)
Ethnic diversity 0.542*** 0.533*** 0.490*** 0.485***
(0.160) (0.160) (0.179) (0.179)
Board experience diversity 0.093** 0.093** 0.057 0.058
(0.044) (0.044) (0.053) (0.053)
Board age diversity 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
CEO duality 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.551*** 0.552***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.110) (0.110)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 86,696 86,696 47,639 47,639
R2 0.138 0.139 0.093 0.094
This table provides regression results with firm fixed effects controlled in the models. Columns (1) and (2) are based on
the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) are based on the data excluding the US data. The dependent variable is firm risk,
defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a year. Board tenure diversity is the coefficient of variation of
directors’ tenure lengths. Board tenure diversity_std is the standard deviation of directors’ tenure lengths. Board tenure
is the average tenure length of the directors. Board size is the natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board.
Board independence, Gender diversity, Ethnic diversity are the proportions of non-executive, female, and foreign directors
on the board, respectively. Board experience diversity is the standard deviation of the number of directorships in any firms,
held by the directors of the listed firm. Board age diversity is the standard deviation of directors’ ages. CEO duality is a
binary variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. The same set of firm-level and country-level controls are included as in Table 4. All regressions include
firm and year fixed effects. All variable definitions are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 6: Firm risk, board tenure diversity and board reforms: difference-in-differences
approach
(1) (2)
[-3, 3] [-6, 6]
Board tenure diversity -0.030 -0.078**
(0.043) (0.040)




Board tenure -0.650*** -0.614***
(0.026) (0.020)
Board size -4.131*** -4.106***
(0.252) (0.196)
Board independence -3.840*** -3.465***
(0.476) (0.369)
Gender diversity -7.755*** -7.258***
(0.704) (0.536)
Ethnic diversity 3.449*** 2.954***
(0.342) (0.260)
Board experience diversity 0.585*** 0.470***
(0.104) (0.083)
Board age diversity 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.024) (0.019)




Firm size -2.311*** -2.253***
(0.052) (0.040)
Sales growth 0.029*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.001)










Stock market value 0.057 -0.111
(0.297) (0.227)
Government stability -0.309 -0.218*
(0.195) (0.112)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Obs. 24,380 39,341
R2 0.569 0.526
This table provides the results of the DID test of how board reforms and the consequent increase in board tenure diversity
affect firm risk. The dependent variable is firm risk, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a year.
Board tenure diversity is the coefficient of variation of directors’ tenure lengths. Post is a dummy variable that equals
one when the year is after the board reform occurred in a country, and zero otherwise, which captures the exogenous
shocks of corporate board reforms. Board tenure is the average tenure length of the directors. Board size is the natural
logarithm of total number of directors on the board. Board independence, Gender diversity, Ethnic diversity are the
proportions of non-executive, female, and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board experience diversity is the
standard deviation of the number of directorships in any firm held by the directors of the listed firm. Board age diversity
is the standard deviation of directors’ ages. CEO duality is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the
board, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the
book value of total assets. Sales growth is the natural logarithm of the current year’s sales minus the natural logarithm
of the previous year’s sales. Cash flow is the ratio of funds from operations to net sales. MB is the market value of total
assets divided by the book value of total assets. Tangibility is net PPE divided by the value of total assets. Leverage is
the ratio of the book value of debt to total assets. Log(GDP) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Stock market
value is the market capitalization of all the listed companies in the country as a proportion of GDP. Government Stability
is government consumption as a proportion of GDP. Columns (1) and (2) present the results using a [-3, 3] and [-6, 6]
window, respectively. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Board tenure diversity and firm risk: does national culture matter?
(1) (2)
Individualism Power distance
Board tenure diversity -1.603*** -1.142***
(0.277) (0.145)
Board tenure diversity × Individualism dummy 0.677**
(0.308)




Power distance dummy 15.581***
(2.565)
Board tenure -0.618*** -0.617***
(0.009) (0.009)
Board size -3.595*** -3.617***
(0.124) (0.124)
Board independence -2.601*** -2.614***
(0.233) (0.233)
Gender diversity -5.832*** -5.710***
(0.319) (0.319)
Ethnic diversity 2.162*** 2.190***
(0.156) (0.156)
Board experience diversity 0.407*** 0.409***
(0.053) (0.053)
Board age diversity 0.223*** 0.225***
(0.012) (0.012)




Firm size -2.113*** -2.113***
(0.025) (0.025)
Sales growth 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001)










Stock market value -0.726*** -0.656***
(0.136) (0.135)
Government stability 0.008 0.005
(0.043) (0.043)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Obs. 86,696 86,696
R2 0.499 0.499
This table provides the results of the OLS regressions in which we examine how national culture moderates the relationship
between board tenure diversity and firm risk. The dependent variable is firm risk, defined as the standard deviation of
daily stock returns in a year. Individualism dummy equals one if the country has a higher individualism/collectivism
value than the median, indicating that people in the country tend to be less likely to give up their ideas to benefit group
coherence, and zero otherwise. Power distance dummy equals one if the country has a higher power distance value than
the median, indicating its higher tolerance of power inequality, and zero otherwise. Board tenure diversity × Individualism
dummy and Board tenure diversity × Power distance dummy are the interactions between board tenure diversity and
the respective culture dummies. Board tenure is the average tenure length of the directors. Board size is the natural
logarithm of total number of directors on the board. Board independence, Gender diversity, and Ethnic diversity are the
proportions of non-executive, female, and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board experience diversity is the
standard deviation of the number of directorships in any firm held by the directors of the listed firm. Board age diversity
is the standard deviation of directors’ ages. CEO duality is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the
board, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the book
value of total assets. Sales growth is the natural logarithm of the current year’s sales minus the natural logarithm of the
previous year’s sales. Cash flow is the ratio of funds from operations to net sales. MB is the market value of total assets
divided by the book value of total assets. Tangibility is net PPE divided by the value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio
of the book value of debt to total assets. Log(GDP) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Stock market value is the
market capitalization of all the listed companies in the country as a proportion of GDP. Government stability is government
consumption as a proportion of GDP. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include industry,
country, and year fixed effects. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 40
Table 8: Board tenure diversity and firm risk: does average tenure length matter?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board tenure diversity -0.354** -0.315* -0.605*** -0.540***
(0.177) (0.179) (0.179) (0.173)
Long tenure dummy 0.753*** 0.436** 0.196 0.796***
(0.188) (0.187) (0.188) (0.186)
Board tenure diversity × Long tenure dummy -1.488*** -1.521*** -0.900*** -1.130***
(0.243) (0.243) (0.244) (0.244)
Board tenure -0.600*** -0.570*** -0.581*** -0.624***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Board size -3.597*** -3.590*** -3.599*** -3.609***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
Board independence -2.602*** -2.617*** -2.582*** -2.580***
(0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232)
Gender diversity -5.691*** -5.695*** -5.733*** -5.703***
(0.318) (0.318) (0.318) (0.318)
Ethnic diversity 2.156*** 2.138*** 2.155*** 2.170***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Board experience diversity 0.412*** 0.414*** 0.412*** 0.410***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Board age diversity 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.228***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
CEO duality 0.523*** 0.521*** 0.521*** 0.522***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
ROA -17.008*** -16.986*** -17.001*** -17.027***
(0.313) (0.312) (0.313) (0.313)
Firm size -2.112*** -2.111*** -2.112*** -2.111***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Sales growth 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash flow -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MB -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.106***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Tangibility -2.221*** -2.212*** -2.221*** -2.226***
(0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172)
Leverage 4.315*** 4.308*** 4.318*** 4.322***
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176)
Log(GDP) -9.152*** -9.171*** -9.162*** -0.652***
(0.807) (0.807) (0.807) (0.134)
Stock market value -0.644*** -0.646*** -0.643*** -9.164***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.806)
Government stability 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 86,696 86,696 86,696 86,696
R2 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.531
This table provides the results of OLS regressions in which we test whether the average tenure length impacts on the relation
between board tenure diversity and firm risk. The dependent variable is firm risk, defined as the standard deviation of
daily stock returns in a year. Board tenure diversity is the coefficient of variation of directors’ tenure lengths. Long tenure
dummy is an indicator that equals one if the board tenure length is longer than each of the following median values, and zero
otherwise: the median by industry and year in column (1), the median by year in column (2), the median by country and
year in column (3), and the median by country, year, and industry at the same time in column (4). Board tenure diversity
× Long tenure dummy is the interaction between Board tenure diversity and Long tenure dummy. Controls include the
following variables: Board tenure is the average tenure length of the directors. Board size is the natural logarithm of
total number of directors on the board. Board independence, Gender diversity, Ethnic diversity are the proportions of
non-executive, female, and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Board experience diversity is the standard deviation
of the number of directorships in any firms held by the directors of the listed firm. Board age diversity is the standard
deviation of directors’ ages. CEO duality is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero
otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total
assets. Sales growth is the natural logarithm of the current year’s sales minus the natural logarithm of the previous year’s
sales. Cash flow is the ratio of funds from operations to net sales. MB is the market value of total assets divided by the
book value of total assets. Tangibility is net PPE divided by the value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book
value of debt to total assets. Log(GDP) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Stock market value is the market
capitalization of all the listed companies in the country as a proportion of GDP. Government Stability is government
consumption as a proportion of GDP. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include industry,
country, and year fixed effects. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 9: Board tenure diversity and corporate policies
(1) (2) (3)
Investment CAPEX Leverage
Board tenure diversity -0.007*** -4.959*** -0.003
(0.002) (1.438) (0.003)
Board tenure -0.000* -0.541*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.069) (0.000)
Board size -0.001 -4.924*** -0.020***
(0.002) (1.516) (0.003)
Board independence -0.029*** -15.000*** 0.048***
(0.003) (2.747) (0.005)
Gender diversity -0.013*** 1.514 0.001
(0.004) (4.577) (0.007)
Ethnic diversity 0.002 -2.902** -0.056***
(0.002) (1.359) (0.003)
Board experience diversity 0.008*** 0.426 -0.007***
(0.001) (0.625) (0.001)
Board age diversity -0.000 0.231*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.084) (0.000)
CEO duality -0.003*** 2.917** 0.007***
(0.001) (1.294) (0.002)
ROA -0.066*** -4.825 -0.281***
(0.006) (5.476) (0.008)
Firm size 0.006*** 0.267 0.042***
(0.000) (0.443) (0.001)
Sales growth 0.000*** 0.252*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.068) (0.000)
Cash flow -0.000*** -0.004 -0.000
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000)
MB 0.003*** 0.456*** 0.008***
(0.000) (0.102) (0.000)




Log(GDP) 0.013 -13.968* -0.018
(0.013) (7.564) (0.016)
Stock market value -0.002 2.600** 0.008***
(0.002) (1.286) (0.003)
Government stability 0.003*** -0.592 0.003***
(0.000) (0.376) (0.001)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 83,256 83,863 86,696
R2 0.156 0.014 0.253
This table provides the results of OLS regressions in which we test for the effect of board tenure diversity on corporate
policies. The dependent variables are Investment, CAPEX and Leverage, respectively. Investment is the increase in
investment over the value of the investment in the last year. CAPEX is capital expenditure on fixed assets over total
assets. Leverage the ratio of the book value of debt to total assets. Board tenure is the average tenure length of the
directors. Board size is the natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. Board independence, Gender
diversity, Ethnic diversity are the proportions of non-executive, female, and foreign directors on the board, respectively.
Board experience diversity is the standard deviation of the number of directorships in any firm held by the directors of the
listed firm. Board age diversity is the standard deviation of directors’ ages. CEO duality is a binary variable that equals
one if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Firm size is
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the natural logarithm of the current year’s sales
minus the natural logarithm of the previous year’s sales. Cash flow is the ratio of funds from operations to net sales. MB
is the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. Tangibility is net PPE divided by the value
of total assets. Log(GDP) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Stock market value is the market capitalization
of all the listed companies in the country as a proportion of GDP. Government Stability is government consumption as a
proportion of GDP. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include industry, country, and year
fixed effects. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
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Appendix A: Variable definition
Variable Definition Data Source
Main variables




Board tenure diversity The coefficient of variation of directors’ tenure lengths BoardEx
Board tenure diversity_std The standard deviation of directors’ tenure lengths BoardEx
Investment The increase in investment over the value of investment in last
year
WTRD
CAPEX Capital expenditure on fixed assets over total assets WTRD
Leverage The ratio of the book value of debt to total assets WTRD
Post A dummy variable that equals one when the year is after the
board reform occurred in a country, and zero otherwise, which
captures the exogenous shock of corporate board reforms
Fauver et al. (2017)
Individualism dummy A dummy variable that equals one if people in a country tend
to be less likely to give up their ideas to benefit group coher-
ence (a country’s Individualism/Collectivism score is above
the median score from Hofstede’s framework), and zero oth-
erwise
Hofstede et al. (2010)
Power distance dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the country has a higher
tolerance for power inequality (a country’s power distance
score is above the median score from Hofstede’s framework),
and zero otherwise
Hofstede et al. (2010)
Board-level controls
Board tenure The average tenure length of the directors BoardEx
Board size The natural logarithm of total number of directors on the
board
BoardEx
Board independence The proportion of non-executive directors on the board BoardEx
Gender diversity The proportion of female directors on the board BoardEx
Ethnic diversity The proportion of foreign directors on the board BoardEx
Board experience diversity The standard deviation of the number of directorships in any
firm held by the directors of the listed firm
BoardEx
Board age diversity The standard deviation of directors’ ages BoardEx
CEO duality A binary variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the
board, and zero otherwise
BoardEx
Firm-level controls
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets WTRD
Firm size The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets WTRD
Tangibility Net Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) divided by the
value of total assets
WTRD
Sales growth The natural logarithm of current year’s sales minus the natural
logarithm of previous year’s sales
WTRD
Cash flow The ratio of funds from operations to net sales WTRD




Stock market value The market capitalization of all the listed companies in the
country as a proportion of GDP
World Development In-
dex (hereafter WDI)
Log(GDP) The natural logarithm of GDP per capita WDI
Government stability Government consumption as a proportion of GDP WDI
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Appendix B: Board tenure diversity and firm idiosyncratic risk
Panel A Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std P25 Median P75
Idiosyncratic risk 82,876 38.226 22.129 23.497 32.450 46.556
Panel B Board tenure diversity and firm idiosyncratic risk
DV = firm idiosyncratic risk
(1)












Board experience diversity 0.278***
(0.105)
























Country fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes
Obs. 82,875
R2 0.401
This table provides the OLS regression results for the relationship between board tenure diversity and firm idiosyncratic
risk. The dependent variable is firm idiosyncratic risk, which is defined as annualized standard deviation of the residuals
from the regression of the firm’s weekly stock returns in year t on the world market index (lag, lead, and contemporaneous).
Board tenure diversity is the coefficient of variation of director tenures. Control variables are the same to the ones in the
baseline regression, defined in Appendix A. All regressions include industry, country and year fixed effects. All variable
definitions are defined in. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Appendix C: Board tenure diversity and firm risk with Fama French 49 industry fixed
effects and country-by-industry fixed effects
(1) (2)
Board tenure diversity -0.753*** -0.870***
(0.131) (0.128)
Board tenure -0.644*** -0.619***
(0.009) (0.009)
Board size -3.966*** -3.700***
(0.127) (0.126)
Board independence -3.254*** -2.806***
(0.235) (0.237)
Gender diversity -7.594*** -5.364***
(0.321) (0.320)
Ethnic diversity 2.784*** 2.068***
(0.160) (0.159)
Board experience diversity 0.453*** 0.315***
(0.054) (0.054)
Board age diversity 0.201*** 0.206***
(0.012) (0.012)




Firm size -2.008*** -2.130***
(0.025) (0.026)
Sales growth 0.025*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001)










Stock market value -0.589*** -0.681***
(0.138) (0.125)
Government stability 0.028 0.009
(0.044) (0.041)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Fama French 49 Industry fixed effects Yes No
Industry fixed effects No Yes
Country-by-industry fixed effects No Yes
Obs. 86,696 86,696
R2 0.478 0.531
This table provides the OLS regression results for the relationship between board tenure diversity and firm risk with Fama
French 49 industry fixed effects in column (1) and with country-by-industry fixed effects in column (2). The dependent
variable is firm risk, which is defined as the daily volatility of stock prices. Board tenure diversity is the coefficient of
variation of director tenures. Control variables are the same to the ones in the baseline regression, defined in Appendix
A. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. All variable definitions are defined in. *, **, and *** indicate
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Appendix D: Firm risk, board tenure diversity and board reforms
(1) (2)
[-3, 3] [-6, 6]
Board tenure diversity -0.059 -0.052
(0.046) (0.044)




Board tenure -0.616*** -0.615***
(0.033) (0.031)
Board size -3.731*** -3.501***
(0.327) (0.307)
Board independence -4.189*** -2.721***
(0.604) (0.573)
Gender diversity -9.061*** -8.265***
(0.937) (0.871)
Ethnic diversity 3.989*** 4.266***
(0.443) (0.411)
Board experience diversity 0.603*** 0.536***
(0.126) (0.118)
Board age diversity 0.268*** 0.269***
(0.030) (0.029)




Firm size -2.358*** -2.329***
(0.067) (0.062)
Sales growth 0.027*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003)










Stock market value 0.629 0.318
(1.099) (0.985)
Government stability -0.796** 0.303
(0.384) (0.280)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Obs. 15,784 18,030
R2 0.591 0.576
This table provides the results of how board reforms and the consequent increase in board tenure diversity affect firm risk
using propensity scores matching in difference-in-differences models. The dependent variable is firm risk, defined as the
standard deviation of daily stock returns in a year. Board tenure diversity is the coefficient of variation of directors’ tenure
lengths. Post is a dummy variable that equals one when the year is after the board reform occurred in a country, and zero
otherwise, which captures the exogenous shock of corporate board reforms. Board tenure is the average tenure length of
the directors. Board size is the natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board. Board independence, Gender
diversity, Ethnic diversity are the proportions of non-executive, female, and foreign directors on the board, respectively.
Board experience diversity is the standard deviation of the number of directorships in any firm held by the directors of the
listed firm. Board age diversity is the standard deviation of directors’ ages. CEO duality is a binary variable that equals
one if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Firm size is the
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the natural logarithm of the current year’s sales minus
the natural logarithm of the previous year’s sales. Cash flow is the ratio of funds from operations to net sales. MB is the
market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets. Tangibility is net PPE divided by the value of total
assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to total assets. Log(GDP) is the natural logarithm of GDP per
capita. Stock market value is the market capitalization of all the listed companies in the country as a proportion of GDP.
Government Stability is government consumption as a proportion of GDP. Columns (1) and (2) present the results using
a [-3, 3] and [-6, 6] window, respectively. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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